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Abstract 
Patients with apparently selective short-term memory (STM) deficits for semantic 
information have played an important role in developing multi-store theories of STM and 
challenge the idea that verbal STM is supported by maintaining activation in the language 
system. We propose that semantic STM deficits are not as selective as previously thought and 
can occur as a result of mild disruption to semantic control processes, i.e., mechanisms that 
bias semantic processing towards task-relevant aspects of knowledge and away from 
irrelevant information. We tested three semantic STM patients with tasks that tapped four 
aspects of semantic control: (i) resolving ambiguity between word meanings, (ii) sensitivity 
to cues, (iii) ignoring irrelevant information and (iv) detecting weak semantic associations. 
All were impaired in conditions requiring more semantic control, irrespective of the STM 
demands of the task, suggesting a mild, but task-general, deficit in regulating semantic 
knowledge. This mild deficit has a disproportionate effect on STM tasks because they have 
high intrinsic control demands: in STM tasks, control is required to keep information active 
when it is no longer available in the environment and to manage competition between items 
held in memory simultaneously. By re-interpreting the core deficit in semantic STM patients 
in this way, we are able to explain their apparently selective impairment without the need for 
a specialised STM store. Instead, we argue that semantic STM patients occupy the mildest 
end of spectrum of semantic control disorders. 
 
Keywords: short-term memory; cognitive control; semantic knowledge; semantic aphasia 
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Introduction 
 The selective disruption of verbal short-term memory (STM) following brain damage 
has been influential in shaping theories of STM in the healthy brain. In particular, reports of 
patients showing impaired recall of verbal material in the short-term but essentially normal 
recall over longer periods (e.g., Warrington & Shallice, 1969) were a major motivation for 
the multi-component working memory model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). These 
investigations focused on the importance of phonological coding in short-term storage, with a 
key claim being that “pure” STM patients exhibited impaired phonological storage but no 
concomitant phonological deficits on other tasks, implying the existence of a phonological 
store that operates independently of the language production system.  
More recently it has become clear that semantic memory deficits are also associated 
with a marked deterioration in verbal STM (Jefferies, Hoffman, Jones, & Lambon Ralph, 
2008; N. Martin & Saffran, 1997; Patterson, Graham, & Hodges, 1994), in line with evidence 
for semantic STM coding in healthy individuals (Poirier & Saint-Aubin, 1995; Walker & 
Hulme, 1999). The involvement of both phonological and semantic coding in verbal STM 
suggests a closer interaction between STM and language processing than has sometimes been 
assumed, with some researchers proposing that specialised STM stores do not exist and that 
short-term storage occurs as a result of ongoing activation within the language system 
(Acheson & MacDonald, 2009; N. Martin & Saffran, 1997; Ruchkin, Grafman, Cameron, & 
Berndt, 2003). On this view, deficits in verbal STM arise as a by-product of damage to 
components of the language system engaged in STM tasks. Therefore, a STM deficit for a 
particular kind of information (e.g., semantic information) reflects damage to the underlying 
representations for that kind of information, and this damage should also be detectable on 
tasks that do not involve STM. In the case of semantic knowledge, this has been 
demonstrated most clearly in patients with semantic dementia, a neurodegenerative disorder 
in which knowledge of word meanings gradually deteriorates. Patients with semantic 
dementia show poorer recall of words that are “unknown” to them as a result of the disease, 
relative to words they comprehend more fully (Forde & Humphreys, 2002; Jefferies, Jones, 
Bateman, & Lambon Ralph, 2004; Patterson et al., 1994). 
 Patients with semantic dementia show a STM deficit that is the consequence of a 
more general degradation of semantic knowledge. In contrast, other studies have revealed 
patients who have a STM deficit for semantic information but do not appear to have semantic 
deficits on other tasks (R. C. Martin & He, 2004; R. C. Martin, Shelton, & Yaffee, 1994). The 
existence of such cases challenges the idea that STM deficits are simply the result of 
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impairments to the language system. Martin and colleagues (1994) have reported two such 
patients who presented with normal scores on standard comprehension and picture naming 
tasks but who were impaired on a number of STM tasks requiring the retention of word 
meanings. For example, they could accurately sort words into semantic categories when 
presented with them individually but were profoundly impaired when given a verbally 
presented list of words and asked whether any belonged in the same category as a subsequent 
probe. In contrast, their ability to perform an analogous task requiring judgements of 
phonological similarity was more preserved. Individuals with this pattern of performance 
have been termed semantic STM cases and it has been suggested that their deficits are best 
explained by a reduction in the capacity of a specialised buffer that holds semantic 
information in mind over a delay (see also R. C. Martin, Lesch, & Bartha, 1999). We refer to 
this theory as the “semantic buffer” account. 
 In this paper, we endorse an alternative explanation of the deficit in such patients: that 
the damage is not to a specialised semantic buffer, but to cognitive control process that 
regulate activation in the semantic system (Hoffman, Jefferies, Ehsan, Hopper, & Lambon 
Ralph, 2009). Our approach is based on investigations of semantic deficits in certain patients 
with stroke aphasia, in whom the regulation of semantic memory is disturbed (Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noonan, Jefferies, Corbett, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). We describe 
these patients more fully later. It is first necessary to say a little about why semantic memory 
should require cognitive control mechanisms at all. We store a wealth of information about 
the properties of objects we encounter in the world and typically only a small subset of our 
knowledge is relevant at any given time. Consider, for example, the two tasks of playing a 
piano versus moving a piano across a room (Saffran, 2000). While both involve the same 
object, a different subset of its properties is germane to each task (functions of the keys and 
pedals in the former case; its size, weight, value and vulnerability to damage in the latter). 
Control processes are therefore needed to activate relevant information and inhibit that which 
is irrelevant for the current context or task. Similar processes are required in lexical-semantic 
processing. Polysemous words have multiple meanings and to comprehend them the 
appropriate meaning must be retrieved based on the current context (Rodd, Davis, & 
Johnsrude, 2005). Even words that are not strictly polysemous can have meanings that vary 
subtly in different (compare “phases of child development” with “phases of the moon”; 
Saffran, Bogyo, Schwartz, & Marin, 1980) and in expressive tasks, even highly constrained 
ones like picture naming, selection between multiple potential responses is required (do I call 
this image of a four-legged creature “animal”, “dog”, “Alsatian” or “Fido”?). Appropriate 
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retrieval of semantic knowledge therefore requires a number of regulatory processes, 
including those that bring task-relevant aspects of knowledge to the fore and those that 
prevent activation of irrelevant information. This regulation has been termed semantic control 
and neuroimaging studies have associated it with activation in left inferior prefrontal, inferior 
parietal and posterior temporal cortex (Nagel, Schumacher, Goebel, & D'Esposito, 2008; 
Rodd et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Wagner, Pare-
Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). Patients with lesions to these areas have multimodal 
semantic deficits arising from poor regulation of semantic knowledge, an impairment we 
have termed “semantic aphasia” (Corbett, Jefferies, Ehsan, & Lambon Ralph, 2009; Jefferies 
& Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noonan et al., 2010). 
What are the likely consequences of a semantic control deficit for STM tasks that 
probe semantic knowledge? We propose that there are two functions ascribed to a semantic 
buffer that are closely linked to semantic control: holding multiple semantic representations 
in mind simultaneously and maintaining activation of semantic representations internally. 
Semantic STM tasks, like many comprehension tasks, involve the processing of multiple 
words in a single trial and require these to be compared with one another on the basis of their 
semantic properties. Simultaneously maintaining a number of semantic representations is 
likely to load heavily on the semantic control system. For example, the activation of multiple 
representations might lead to increased competition between items (Jefferies, Hoffman et al., 
2008). This interpretation has been applied recently to a patient with semantic STM deficit. 
Hamilton and Martin (2005) found that their patient ML had difficulty inhibiting irrelevant 
information across a range of verbal tasks and hypothesised that the competition between 
active representations was the cause of his semantic STM deficit. An additional demand of 
STM tasks is the need to keep representations of presented stimuli active after those stimuli 
are no longer present in the environment. Many theories of verbal STM hold that retention 
occurs by maintaining activation of the units in which long-term linguistic knowledge is 
coded (MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002; N. Martin & Saffran, 1997; Ruchkin et al., 2003), 
perhaps through a process of controlled attention (Cowan, 1995). Successful maintenance 
depends not only on the relevant linguistic (in this case, semantic) knowledge being intact but 
also on its activation being appropriately maintained during the delay. Unlike other semantic 
tasks, where activation could be refreshed by for example re-fixating on the presented picture 
or word, in a STM paradigm this activation is entirely reliant on internal cognitive control. 
These factors predict that, in general, semantic STM tasks should place greater 
demands on semantic controls than other types of semantic task. For this reason, patients with 
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sufficiently mild semantic control deficits might show impairment on semantic STM tasks 
while other, less demanding semantic tasks remain relatively unaffected. Though such 
patients would appear to show a selective deficit for maintaining semantic information, their 
underlying deficit would be similar to that seen in other patients with impaired semantic 
control (e.g., semantic aphasia; Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). If patients with semantic 
control deficits were arranged on a severity continuum (N. Martin, 2009), semantic STM 
patients would occupy the mildest end of the continuum, while patients towards the severe 
end of the continuum would display deficits on a wider range of semantic tasks.  
In line with this theory, in a recent study we found evidence for more general 
semantic impairments in two patients with semantic STM deficits (Hoffman et al., 2009). The 
two semantic STM cases, JB and ABU, conformed to the pattern observed in previous 
patients in that they showed a severe deficit on STM tasks requiring semantic knowledge, but 
semantic memory more generally was unimpaired on standard tests. However, we also 
administered some more demanding semantic assessments that did not load on STM, such as 
generating a verb in response to a noun (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and these tasks 
revealed mild semantic impairments. We directly compared the semantic STM cases with 
semantic aphasia (SA) patients, who have more severe multimodal semantic deficits arising 
from impaired semantic control. On the STM tasks they showed a similar, albeit more 
severely impaired, pattern of performance to the semantic STM cases. On the demanding 
semantic tasks, the milder cases in this group showed deficits of a similar magnitude as the 
semantic STM patients. These findings are consistent with the idea that both sets of patients 
share a common semantic impairment, manifested at different levels of severity. However, 
there are two imporat. First, there is no direct evidence that the semantic STM patients’ 
difficulty with demanding semantic tasks is due to their higher control requirements. Second, 
there is no evidence that the STM deficit has the same root cause as the deficits on other 
semantic tasks. In the present study, we addressed these two issues in three semantic STM 
patients with tasks that directly manipulated the level of semantic control required. Two of 
these tasks were presented in both a visual form and a more demanding STM format, 
enabling us to test whether similar control deficits were present irrespective of the 
requirement to use STM. All tasks were previously used by Noonan et al. (2010) to 
investigate semantic control impairments in a case-series of SA patients. Each task probed a 
different ability related to semantic control and revealed control impairments in SA patients. 
The abilities we targeted were: 
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 (1) Resolving ambiguity between potential word meanings (Experiment 1). 
Processing polysemous words is thought to recruit semantic control processes in order to 
resolve competition between the possible interpretations of the word and to select the 
contextually-appropriate meaning (Bedny, Hulbert, & Thompson-Schill, 2007; Rodd et al., 
2005; Whitney, Grossman, & Kircher, 2009). Noonan et al. (2010) tested SA patients’ 
comprehension of words with multiple meanings and found better comprehension of 
dominant meanings relative to less commonly used meanings (e.g., they were more accurate 
when matching ball with bat than ball with dance). 
(2) Sensitivity to cues that bias semantic processing towards the correct response 
(Experiment 1). SA patients showed large benefits of external cues that were designed to bias 
processing towards appropriate semantic representations and away from irrelevant ones. For 
example, phonological cues substantially improved picture naming performance (Jefferies, 
Patterson, & Lambon Ralph, 2008), while miscuing with the first phonemes of a semantically 
related word had a detrimental effect on picture naming, presumably because this increased 
the activation of competing semantic representations (Noonan et al., 2010). In polysemous 
word comprehension, sentence cues helped the patients to access the less frequent meanings 
of homonyms (e.g., when given the sentence “She wore her new dress to the ball”, their 
ability to match ball with dance improved). This is again indicative of problems regulating 
access to semantic knowledge. Cues can help in these circumstances because they boost 
activation of the target representations, enabling them to overcome interference from 
irrelevant competitors that were activated by the stimulus. 
(3) Resisting interference from strong but irrelevant semantic associations 
(Experiment 2). SA patients are highly susceptible to competition from irrelevant semantic 
associations. Noonan et al. (2010) demonstrated this using a synonym matching task in which 
foils shared an irrelevant relationship with the probe (Samson, Connolly, & Humphreys, 
2007). Accuracy declined when the foil was strongly related to the target (e.g., matching 
piece with slice in the presence of the distractor word cake) because the patients selected 
these strong but task-irrelevant associations. Further evidence for interference from irrelevant 
but associated information came from an analysis of their picture naming errors (Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2006). Patients made a number of associative errors (e.g., squirrel → “nuts”; 
lorry → “diesel”), suggesting that they successfully activated conceptual information relating 
to the picture but were unable to select the appropriate response. Finally, the patients showed 
“refractory access” effects (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983): they were adversely affected 
when a small set of semantically related items were repeatedly probed (Jefferies, Baker, 
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Doran, & Lambon Ralph, 2007). These presentation conditions encouraged build-up of 
activation in a set of competing semantic representations, which the patients were unable to 
resolve. 
(4) Detecting associations between distantly related concepts (Experiments 3 and 4). 
SA patients have difficulty using their semantic knowledge flexibly to determine 
relationships between items. When matching items on the basis of similarity, they performed 
well when the items were closely related to each other (e.g., matching hat with cap) but 
performed poorly with more distant semantic relationships (Noonan et al., 2010). While 
closely related items automatically activated highly overlapping semantic representations that 
were sufficient to detect the match, the distantly related items required more controlled 
interrogation of semantic knowledge to determine the correct response. In line with this 
conclusion, on a test of semantic associative knowledge (the Camel and Cactus test; Bozeat, 
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000), their performance across trials was 
influenced by the ease with which the relevant semantic relationship could be determined 
(Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006). 
Our key prediction was that each of these manipulations would influence semantic 
processing in semantic STM patients, regardless of whether the task had a strong STM 
component. In the visual versions of the tasks, STM demands were reduced by presenting 
stimuli as written words, with no time limit on responses and the stimuli present throughout 
(words were also read aloud by the experimenter). Although these tasks required patients to 
hold multiple semantic representations in mind on each trial, maintaining this activation was 
relatively easy because the words were still available in the environment. In Experiments 2, 3 
and 4, we contrasted this presentation format with a verbal STM format in which presentation 
was auditory only. On these tasks, in addition to activating multiple concepts at the same 
time, activation was entirely reliant on internal cognitive control. Both the semantic buffer 
and the semantic control hypotheses predicted that the patients would have some difficulty 
with all of the tasks, because of the requirement to process multiple concepts at once, and that 
the STM presentation format would be particularly challenging, because of the need to 
maintain the activation while making a decision. However, the control hypothesis specifically 
predicted that patients would be more impaired on trials with a high semantic control 
requirement. These effects would not be expected if the patients’ deficits were the result of a 
reduction in the capacity of a semantic STM store, because the amount of semantic 
information to be retained (i.e., the number of words presented) was the same in the high and 
low control conditions of each of our tasks. 
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Case Descriptions 
 JB was a 52 year-old man who left school at the age of 15 and was employed as a 
factory foreman. He suffered a left-hemisphere haemorrhagic CVA in April 2005. His 
language profile when assessed four months after the stroke was classified as transcortical 
sensory aphasia. His speech was fluent and his ability to repeat verbal material was excellent 
but he displayed marked comprehension and word-finding difficulties. He correctly named 
seven of the first seventeen items on the Boston Naming Test without cues (BNT; Kaplan, 
Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1983). We enrolled JB in February 2006, by which time his 
language skills had improved substantially. There were no obvious abnormalities in his 
spontaneous speech or comprehension, though he still complained of occasional word-finding 
difficulties. A structural MRI scan was obtained, which revealed left hemisphere damage in 
the temporal and parietal cortices. The superior temporal gyrus and sulcus were intact along 
their lengths and as was the anterior part of the temporal lobe. Loss of tissue was primarily 
along the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri (including the underlying white matter), and to 
a lesser extent the middle temporal gyrus. There was also a widening of the left sylvian 
fissure and the posterior horn of the lateral ventricle, which may indicate some additional 
damage in the surrounding inferior parietal cortex. A more detailed summary of 
neuropsychological testing for JB and the other patients is given below. 
 ABU was a 54 year-old man who left school at the age of 15 and was employed as a 
sheet metal worker for a number of years. He experienced a CVA in June 2003. ABU 
presented acutely with word-finding difficulty and mild comprehension problems, correctly 
naming nine of the first 23 items in the BNT (without cues). However, his language abilities 
recovered after this initial period. When first seen by us in December 2006, his 
comprehension was good and his speech was fluent though punctuated by occasional 
hesitations. His phrase length also appeared slightly reduced. He could successfully name 
43/60 pictures in the BNT. High-quality structural imaging is not available for this patient. In 
a CT scan obtained shortly after the CVA, the left lateral ventricle appeared enlarged and the 
grey-white matter contrast in the basal ganglia was reduced on the left side, which could 
indicate a diffuse left-hemisphere partial infarction. 
 JHU was a 74 year-old man who left school aged 15 and spent most of his working 
life as an estate agent. He suffered a left hemisphere CVA in February 2008 and was referred 
to us in March 2009. He presented with fluent speech although he had occasional word-
finding difficulties. He displayed no comprehension deficits in everyday conversation and he 
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was able to name 45/60 items in the BNT (without cues). Imaging is currently unavailable for 
this patient. 
 
Neuropsychological Assessment 
General Neuropsychology 
 Results from background neuropsychological testing are shown in Table 1. Several 
subtests from the Visual Object and Space Perception battery (VOSP; Warrington & James, 
1991) were administered, as was copying of the Rey complex figure (Rey, 1941). These tests 
revealed good visuospatial function in all patients. Patients also completed three tests of 
executive function and non-verbal problem-solving, namely Raven’s Standard Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, 1992), the Brixton test of spatial anticipation (Burgess & Shallice, 1996), 
and the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (WCST; Milner, 1964; Stuss et al., 2000). On these 
tests the patients scored within the normal range for healthy controls, although their scores 
tended to fall toward the lower end of the range. 
-Table 1 around here- 
Short-Term Memory 
 A detailed assessment of JB and ABU’s performance on tests of semantic memory 
and STM were reported by Hoffman et al. (2009) and is summarised in Table 2. Scores on 
the same assessments for JHU are also shown. All patients had forward and backward digit 
spans in the normal range and could repeat lists of nonwords as accurately as healthy controls 
(see Hoffman et al., 2009 for further details of these tests). This indicates preserved STM for 
items maintained using a phonological code. Further evidence for normal phonological 
coding in STM was seen in the patients’ recall of lists of letters. All showed the expected 
phonological similarity effect of poorer recall of phonologically similar letters. In contrast, 
phonological similarity effects are reduced in patients with phonological storage deficits (R. 
C. Martin & Breedin, 1992). However, AB and JHU did show an overall impairment in 
retaining letter lists, indicating the phonological STM is not entirely preserved in these cases. 
-Table 2 around here- 
 In contrast, there was clear evidence for impaired STM for semantically mediated 
information. The “lexicality effect” denoting better recall of real words relative to nonwords 
is often taken as a marker of lexical/semantic coding in STM (Hulme, Maughan, & Brown, 
1991; Jefferies, Hoffman et al., 2008; R. C. Martin et al., 1994). The size of the lexicality 
effect was reduced in all three patients. AB and JHU had impaired word list recall despite 
normal memory for nonwords. JB’s word list recall fell within the normal range but was 
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lower than expected given his excellent memory for nonwords. Thus, it appears that our 
patients had difficulty taking advantage of semantic information to aid their recall. Further 
evidence for this came from semantic category and rhyme probe tasks (R. C. Martin et al., 
1994). In these, patients were presented with an auditory list of words and decided whether a 
subsequent probe was related to any of the words in the list. In the phonological condition, 
judgements were made based on whether the probe rhymed with any of the preceding words, 
while the semantic condition required patients to decide whether the probe belonged in the 
same semantic category as any list words. The tasks therefore emphasised memory for either 
the phonological or semantic characteristics of the words. The results in Table 2 show the 
maximum list length achieved by the patients in each condition (testing was discontinued 
when their accuracy fell below 75%). For judgements based on rhyming, patients performed 
as well as controls, achieving spans of between six and nine words. However, when 
judgements were made on the semantic criterion of category membership, all patients were 
severely impaired, failing at lists of between two or three words. This pattern of preserved 
phonological STM but impaired memory for semantic information has been termed a 
semantic STM deficit (R. C. Martin et al., 1994). 
 
Semantic Processing 
 Previous studies of semantic STM patients have tested verbal comprehension and 
single-word production to rule out the possibility that a more general deficit in semantic 
memory could account for the STM problem. We initially assessed semantic processing using 
the Cambridge 64-item semantic battery, which probes knowledge of the same 64 living and 
non-living items across different input and output modalities (Bozeat et al., 2000). The tests 
included were: (a) Spoken picture naming: the patients were asked to name a black and white 
line drawing of each item taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set; (b) spoken 
word-picture matching: subjects matched spoken names to pictures. On each trial there were 
nine semantically related foils, all category co-ordinates of the target. The target and foils 
were all Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) pictures; and (c) semantic association (Camel and 
Cactus test): a test similar to the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (Howard & Patterson, 1992) 
in which subjects decided which of four semantically related items was most associated with 
a stimulus (e.g., does CAMEL go with CACTUS, TREE, SUNFLOWER or ROSE). There were two 
versions: in one, the probe and choices were coloured pictures; in the other, they were 
presented as written words that were also read aloud by the examiner. 
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 These tests suggested that semantic processing was relatively intact in all patients: 
each patient fell slightly outside the normal range in one test, but otherwise performed well. 
This apparent preservation of semantic knowledge might give the impression that the 
patients’ deficits were indeed restricted to STM tasks. However, in our previous study we 
also tested semantic processing in JB and ABU with more demanding speeded 
comprehension and naming tests in which they were encouraged to respond as quickly as 
possible (see Hoffman et al., 2009 for details). Both patients showed some evidence of 
impairment either in accuracy or RT. In addition, a verb generation task provided further 
evidence of a mild semantic impairment. The full set of tests was not run in patient JHU but 
Table 2 shows the performance of all three patients on a category fluency test. This task has 
high cognitive control requirements due to its unconstrained and open-ended nature. In 
contrast to the other semantic tests, all patients were impaired on this more demanding 
assessment.  
To summarise, all patients showed deficits for semantic information in STM tasks but 
performed well on standard semantic assessments of the kind typically used to reveal 
semantic memory impairment. This pattern of spared and impaired function has previously 
been explained in terms of a specific STM buffer for semantic information (R. C. Martin et 
al., 1994). However, we suggest that the root cause is impairment to cognitive control 
processes that regulate activation in the semantic system. The present study tested this 
hypothesis directly by manipulating cognitive control requirements across a range of 
semantic tasks. 
 
Experimental Manipulations of Semantic Control in Tasks Varying in STM Demands 
Across four experiments, we explored the prediction that manipulations of semantic 
control would influence semantic processing in semantic STM patients. These experiments 
contrasted demanding STM tasks with visually-presented versions of the tasks, and compared 
the size of these effects in the patients to healthy controls. 
Control participants: Seventeen healthy participants were recruited from the 
Neuroscience and Aphasia Research Unit volunteer panel to take part in this study. They had 
a mean age of 63.6 years and had completed 13.8 years of education on average. Eight 
participants took part in Experiment 1 and also completed the tasks in Experiments 2 and 3 
under visual presentation. The remaining nine completed the STM tasks in Experiments 2 and 
4. 
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 Statistical analyses: We compared the performance of our patients as a group to that 
of controls using ANOVA. We also considered the performance of each patient individually. 
Our key prediction in each experiment was that patients would be particularly impaired in 
conditions with high semantic control demands. To test this prediction, where possible we 
used Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2005) Unstandardised Test for Differences to determine 
whether the difference between high and low control conditions in each patient exceeded that 
observed in the control group. In some cases, however, we were unable to apply this test 
because all of the controls scored 100% correct in the low control condition. In addition, 
Crawford and Howell’s (1998) modified t-test was used to determine whether patients were 
significantly impaired on each task as a whole. 
 
Experiment 1: Resolving Semantic Ambiguity and the Influence of Cueing 
 This experiment examined comprehension of the dominant vs. less common meanings 
of homonyms. When homonyms are encountered, possible meanings are activated 
simultaneously and compete for selection (Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Rodd, Gaskell, & 
Marslen-Wilson, 2004; Simpson & Burgess, 1984). Control mechanisms are required to bias 
processing toward the appropriate interpretation of the word and this control function is 
particularly important when a more unusual meaning must be selected in the face of strong 
competition from the dominant interpretation of the word (Bedny et al., 2007; Rodd et al., 
2005). Noonan et al. (2010) tested comprehension of homonyms in patients with semantic 
control deficits. Patients were required to match the target word to a semantically related 
word, which related to either the dominant or the less common meaning of the word. In some 
cases the word was presented in a sentence that cued that appropriate meaning and on other 
trials the sentence cued the alternative meaning (see Figure 1A). Overall, patients performed 
better with dominant meanings, as expected if control plays a more important role in 
accessing less common word meanings. This effect also interacted with cue consistency. 
When sentence cues were inconsistent with the relevant meaning, performance for the less 
common meanings was particularly affected, in line with increased competition from the 
dominant meaning activated by the cue. However, when provided with sentences that cued 
the appropriate meaning, performance improved and the difference between dominant and 
less common meanings was virtually eliminated. These sentences boosted activation of the 
relevant meaning, reducing the competition between meanings and allowing less common 
interpretations to be retrieved. If our semantic STM patients suffer from a semantic control 
deficit, we would expect them to show a similar advantage for dominant word meanings in 
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the face of inconsistent sentences. Meaning-consistent sentence cues, on the other hand, 
should boost comprehension of less frequent interpretations. 
-Figure 1 about here- 
Method 
 We employed the semantic ambiguity task devised by Noonan et al. (2010). 
Participants were asked to select which of four words was related in meaning to a probe 
word. The probe was printed on a page with the four choices beneath; these were also read 
aloud by the experimenter. In half of the trials, the target referred to the dominant meaning of 
the probe word (FIRE → HOT). The other trials featured associations based on a less common 
meaning of the probe (FIRE → RIFLE). There were thirty ambiguous probe words, each 
presented four times in total. The same distractors were used in both the dominant and less 
common trials for each probe; none of the distractors were related to either meaning of the 
probe. Each trial was preceded by a sentence that was either consistent with the meaning of 
the probe (e.g., for the FIRE → HOT trial: “I lit a fire”), or was consistent with the alternative 
meaning (“Fire at will”). Sentences were presented in a written format immediately before 
each trial and were also read aloud. Instructions and practice trials emphasised that the task 
was to find the word related to the probe, not to the sentence, and that the sentence would 
sometimes not be helpful. Testing was completed over two sessions, with both meanings of 
each probe word tested once in each session.  
 
Results 
 Group level: Accuracy in each condition is shown in Figure 2. We compared 
comprehension in the patients to that of healthy controls using an ANOVA with dominance 
and cue type included as within-subjects factors and participant group as a between-subjects 
factor. This revealed main effects of group (F(1,9) = 65.6, p < 0.001), indicating poorer 
comprehension in the patients, as well as effects of dominance (F(1,9) = 21.6, p = 0.001) and 
cue type (F(1,9) = 52.3, p < 0.001). Interactions between group and dominance (F(1,9) = 
7.79, p < 0.05) and group and cue type (F(1,9) = 39.1, p < 0.001) were also significant, 
reflecting larger effects of these manipulations in the patients. Finally, there was an 
interaction between dominance and cue type (F(1,9) = 17.3, p < 0.005) and a three-way 
interaction between these factors and group (F(1,9) = 7.54, p < 0.05), reflecting the fact that 
meaning dominance had a greater impact for inconsistent cues and that this effect was greater 
in the patients.  
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 Individual patients: Each patient was impaired on the task as a whole when analysed 
individually (modified t-test: t(7) > 7.2, p < 0.001). All three patients showed significantly 
better comprehension with consistent sentences (McNemar one-tailed p < 0.05). Crawford 
and Garthwaite’s (2005) Unstandardised Test for Differences indicated that all three patients 
showed larger effects of the cue type than controls (t(7) > 4.8, p < 0.003). In addition, JB and 
ABU both showed poorer comprehension of less common meanings (McNemar p < 0.05 for 
both patients) while there was no such effect for JHU. We were unable to assess whether 
these effects were larger than in the control group, as none of the controls made any errors in 
comprehension of dominant meanings.  
-Figure 2 around here- 
Discussion 
 Patients with semantic STM deficits showed effects of cueing in their comprehension 
of ambiguous words and two of the three patients displayed better comprehension of more 
dominant meanings. They were almost as accurate as controls when the appropriate meaning 
was cued by a preceding sentence. However, performance declined when a competing 
meaning was primed by the sentence cue. In JB and ABU, this effect was more pronounced 
when the meaning to be retrieved was infrequent and therefore a weak competitor to begin 
with (though JHU did not show this interaction). These results mirror those seen in semantic 
aphasic patients with semantic control deficits and suggest that semantic STM patients have 
difficulty resolving interference between competing semantic representations. These results 
would not have been expected if the patients’ deficits stemmed from damage to a semantic 
buffer, as the amount of information to be processed was held constant across conditions. It is 
also important to consider the impact of a semantic buffer deficit on the processing of the 
sentence cues. If the patients had a reduced capacity for storing semantic information, they 
would have been unable to process the cues efficiently. The fact that we observed significant 
differences between the consistent and inconsistently cued trials indicates that this was not 
the case. The patients were strongly influenced by the semantic information in the sentences, 
suggesting that they were able to process and retain this information.  
 
Experiment 2: Resisting Interference from Strong but Irrelevant Associates 
 Experiment 2 investigated the patients’ ability to ignore information that was related 
to the concept being probed but irrelevant to the task. The ability to focus on relevant aspects 
of knowledge while avoiding interference from irrelevant information is considered to be a 
key semantic control function (Badre & Wagner, 2002; Thompson-Schill, Bedny, & 
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Goldberg, 2005). Samson et al. (2007) tested this ability in a patient with a semantic control 
deficit using synonym and antonym judgement tasks in which one of the distractor words 
shared an irrelevant relationship with the probe (see Figure 1B). The patient often selected 
the related distractor rather than the target, particularly when the irrelevant probe-distractor 
association was stronger than the relationship between target and probe. Noonan et al. (2010) 
found similar results using the same tasks in a larger group of semantic aphasia cases. These 
errors can be explained by damage to control mechanisms that bias semantic processing 
towards task-relevant information. Because of the presence of irrelevant semantic 
relationships, this task has a strong intrinsic control component, as participants must focus on 
the appropriate relationship. This is particularly difficult when the probe-distractor 
relationship is stronger than the probe-target relationship. If semantic STM patients have 
semantic control deficits that affect their ability to bias semantic processing toward task-
relevant information, we would expect them to be impaired on this task generally, even when 
STM demands are low, and most impaired when the probe-distractor associations were 
strong. If their STM deficit was due to damage to a semantic buffer, overall impairment on 
the task would be seen, particularly in the STM condition, but effects of distractor type would 
not be observed as the number of items to be retained was the same across conditions. 
 
Method 
We used materials from Experiment 2 of Samson et al. (2007). Participants were 
presented with a probe word and decided which of three words had a similar meaning. In 
addition to one of the choice words being a synonym of the target, another semantically 
related but irrelevant word was included as a foil. For example, the probe PIECE was 
presented with the target SLICE and was accompanied by CAKE (associated foil) and RESIDENT 
(unrelated foil). Word association norms were used to manipulate the strength of association 
between the probe and the related distractor (see Samson et al., 2007 for further details). On 
half of the trials, the probe and target shared a strong relationship and the relationship to the 
distractor was weak. On the remaining trials this was reversed and the distractor was more 
strongly related to the probe than the target. There were 84 trials in total.  
Two versions of the task were administered, each using the same materials. In the 
visual version, the probe and three choices were printed on a piece of paper that remained in 
view until the participant responded (verbally or by pointing). In the STM version, the three 
choices and probe were read aloud by the experimenter at a rate of one word per second but 
there was no visual presentation. Participants made a verbal response. Patients completed the 
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two versions of the task in a counter-balanced fashion over two sessions at least a week apart. 
Each probe was presented once per session. In the control group, a between-subjects design 
was used such that participants only completed one version of the task.  
The task was explained using easy practice examples that emphasised the need to 
focus on synonyms and not other associations (e.g., FIELD with MEADOW not COW). Patients 
were also reminded of the instructions midway through each session. 
 
Results 
 Group level: Results for the visual and STM versions of the task are shown in Figure 
3. Each version of the task was analysed separately as they were completed by different sets 
of control participants. A 2 x 2 (distractor type x group) ANOVA conducted on the visual 
data revealed main effects of distractor type (F(1,9) = 28.7, p < 0.001) and group (F(1,9) = 
16.4, p < 0.005) as well as an interaction (F(1,9) = 9.44, p < 0.02). This reflects the fact that 
the patients were less accurate than controls and that, while patients and controls were both 
more likely to make errors when words were accompanied by strongly related distractors, this 
effect was more pronounced in the patients. Similar results were obtained when the STM data 
were analysed (distractor type: F(1,10) = 33.2, p < 0.001; group: F(1,10) = 35.6, p < 0.001; 
interaction: F(1,9) = 11.9, p < 0.01).  
 Individual patients: When each patient was considered individually, they were all 
impaired on the STM version of the task (t(8) > 2.8, p < 0.01) though only ABU and JHU 
were impaired when the task was presented visually (t(8) > 7.3, p < 0.001). Overall, all 
patients were more accurate with visual presentation (McNemar one-tailed p < 0.05).  
The Unstandardised Test for Differences indicated that, for the STM test, JB and ABU 
showed larger effects of distractor type than controls (t(8) > 2.8, p < 0.05), with the effect in 
JHU falling just short of statistical significance (t(8) = 2.08, p = 0.07). On the visual task, 
none of the patients showed a significantly exaggerated control effects when considered 
individually (t(7) < 1.7, p > 0.14). However, it is worth noting that the earlier ANOVA 
indicated that the patients showed a larger effect than controls when considered as a group, so 
the null results at the individual subject level most likely reflect a lack of power and the fact 
that the manipulation had a more subtle effect on the visual task. 
 Finally, we also examined whether the patients selected the related or unrelated 
distractor when they made an error. JB chose the related distractor on 6/7 errors in the visual 
test and 17/18 errors on the STM test. ABU chose the related distractor for 29/32 errors under 
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visual presentation and on 34/41 occasions during the STM test. For JHU, the respective 
figures were 22/23 for the visual test and 33/36 for STM. 
-Figure 3 around here- 
Discussion 
 All patients showed impaired ability to ignore irrelevant semantic associations, 
consistent with an underlying semantic control deficit. This effect was present irrespective of 
whether the stimuli were presented visually or had to be retained in STM, indicating that 
impaired semantic control affected both STM and non-STM performance.  
 
Experiment 3: Detecting Associations between Weakly Related Concepts 
 This experiment tested our patients’ ability to access semantic knowledge flexibly in 
order to detect associations between weakly related concepts. Neuroimaging studies have 
shown that detecting weak semantic associations produces greater activation in inferior 
frontal and posterior temporal regions involved in semantic control (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-
Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Wagner et al., 2001). Noonan et al. (2010) demonstrated 
that this ability was impaired in patients with semantic control deficits using a similarity 
matching task in which the semantic “distance” between target and probe was varied. Patients 
were more likely to detect the relationship when the target and probe were very similar and 
shared numerous semantic features (e.g., HAT and CAP) than when their association was 
weaker (e.g., HAT and STOCKING; see also Figure 1C). Because strongly related items activate 
very similar semantic representations their relationship was detected with little need for 
controlled processing. When the association was weaker, greater control was needed to 
activate the relevant shared attributes to determine the relationship. Here, we tested the ability 
to detect weak semantic relationships in our semantic STM patients. 
 
Method 
 We used the semantic distance task described by Noonan et al. (2010). Participants 
were presented with the probe word printed on a sheet of paper above three choices: a target 
and two unrelated distractors. All of the words were also read aloud by the experimenter and 
the participant was asked to select which item was most similar to the probe. The probes 
consisted of 64 concrete nouns from eight categories (animals, birds, plants, fruit/vegetables, 
tools, clothes, vehicles and household objects). Each probe was paired with one target that 
was very closely related to it and another that shared some similarity but was more distantly 
related (e.g., GRAPE was paired with CHERRY and CAULIFLOWER). Although these items were 
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drawn from eight categories, subjects were not informed of the categories used in the test and 
were not instructed to make their judgements on the basis of category membership; they were 
simply asked to indicate which item was most similar to the probe. Each probe was presented 
once with the close and once with the distant target and on both occasions with the same two 
unrelated distractors. Each target appeared as a close match to one probe and as a distant 
match to another, ensuring that items in close and distant conditions were equal in their 
familiarity and their category typicality. Testing was completed over two sessions, with each 
probe presented once per session. 
 
Results 
 Group level: Results are shown in Figure 4. A 2 x 2 (semantic distance x group) 
ANOVA revealed effects of distance (F(1,9) = 39.6, p < 0.001) and group (F(1,9) = 70.3, p < 
0.001) and a highly significant interaction (F(1,9) = 24.0, p = 0.001), indicating that patients 
had particular difficulty on distantly related trials.  
 Individual patients: Overall, each patient was impaired when assessed individually 
(t(7) > 5.3, p < 0.001). Two patients were significantly worse at detecting distant 
relationships (McNemar one-tailed test; ABU: p = 0.001; JHU: p < 0.001) and a similar trend 
was observed for JB (p = 0.09). We were unable to assess whether the semantic distance 
effect of each individual patient was larger than that found in the control group, because none 
of the controls made any errors in the close condition. 
-Figure 4 around here-  
 
Discussion 
 Semantic STM patients were able to match semantically related items when they were 
very similar but had more difficulty when the semantic relationship between the items was 
weaker. The STM demands were similar in the two conditions of the task, since the same 
number of items were presented and held in mind in order to make a semantic decision. The 
patients’ deficits on this task most likely reflect impaired semantic control processes, as more 
control was needed to interrogate semantic information flexibly and detect the more distant 
semantic relationships (Noonan et al., 2010). 
 
Experiment 4: Strength of Semantic Relationship in a STM Task 
 The final experiment investigated the effect of semantic distance in an auditory-verbal 
STM task. We included the semantic distance manipulation in a standard test format used to 
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identify semantic STM deficits: Martin et al.’s (1994) category probe task. Patients were 
presented with an auditory list of items followed by a probe and verified whether the probe 
belonged to the same semantic category as any of the list items. The criterion of category 
membership is necessary in this paradigm to give subjects a basis on which to decide whether 
two items match. However, it is easy to find pairs of items that belong to the same 
superordinate category but are rather distant in semantic space (e.g., lion and octopus, which 
are both animals but are different in many ways) as well as those that are very closely related 
(e.g., lion and leopard; see Figure 1D). In addition to varying the semantic distance between 
the probe and target, we varied the number of items in the list. The semantic buffer 
hypothesis predicted that list length would be the main determinant of performance, since a 
reduction in the capacity of the buffer would affect the patients’ memory for long lists. In 
contrast, we predicted that semantic distance have a strong effect on performance. The logic 
was the same as for Experiment 3: we assumed that the degree of similarity between items 
would guide subjects’ decisions and that patients would have particular difficulty in detecting 
more distant matches, because these require more controlled, flexible access to semantic 
knowledge. 
 
Method 
The task featured the same pairings of probes with close and distant targets as in 
Experiment 3, but in a probe verification task commonly used to detect semantic STM 
deficits. Participants were presented with an auditory list of words presented at a rate of one 
per second. This was followed by a pause of 1.5 seconds and then by a probe word. They 
were asked to decide whether the probe belonged to the same category as any of the items in 
the list. On half of the trials the probe shared a category with one list item while on the 
remaining trials there was no match. For matching trials, each list was presented twice, once 
with a closely related target (e.g., list: LORRY, CHERRY, SKIRT; probe: GRAPE) and once with a 
target that was more distantly related but still belonged to the same category (e.g., list: 
LORRY, CAULIFLOWER, SKIRT; probe: GRAPE; the relevant category in this case being fruits and 
vegetables). Apart from the target, lists were identical in the close and distant conditions so 
that the information to be remembered was the same in both conditions but in the distant 
condition participants had to detect a more remote semantic relationship. In addition, to 
exclude the possibility that targets in one condition were less typical of their category, we 
obtained typicality ratings from Morrow and Duffy’s (2005) norms for 85% of the targets. 
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There was no difference in typicality between close and distant conditions (t(161) = 0.38, p = 
0.7). 
 To avoid floor and ceiling effects, patients and controls were presented with lists of 
different lengths. We constructed lists of one, two, three, four, six and seven items, with 64 
lists at each length. Patients received all of the lists of lengths one to four and controls 
completed lengths three to seven. Prior to beginning each testing session, all participants 
completed a sorting task to ensure that they were familiar with the test items and the 
categories to which they belonged. For this, the names of the eight categories were printed on 
cards and placed in front of the participant. They were given a stack of 128 cards, with a 
word from the test printed on each, and were asked to place each card next to the category it 
belonged in. Any errors were corrected by the experimenter. During the test, the list of 
categories was also available for patients to consult between trials if they wished. Finally, 
there were two pairs of categories that were closely related and could have led to confusion 
(animals vs. birds; plants vs. fruits and vegetables). We avoided using items from these 
categories together where the outcome could have been ambiguous (e.g., when the probe was 
an animal, we did not present any birds in the list). 
 
Results 
Group level: In order to compare patients and controls directly, results were divided 
into three bands: lists of one and two items (completed by patients only), three and four items 
(by patients and controls) and six and seven items (controls only; see Table 3). We directly 
compared the performance of patients and controls on the lists of three and four items that all 
subjects completed. A 2 x 2 (semantic distance x group) ANOVA revealed effects of distance 
(F(1,10) = 38.9, p < 0.001) and group (F(1,10) = 45.2, p < 0.001) as well as an interaction 
(F(1,10) = 13.8, p < 0.005), indicating the patients were more strongly affected by the 
semantic distance manipulation. It is also worth noting that controls showed weak effects of 
semantic distance on the longest lists. We carried out a 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA on the 
control data, with list length (3 and 4 combined vs. 6 and 7 combined) and semantic distance 
(close vs. distant) as within-subjects factors. This revealed main effects of length (F(1,8) = 
47.1, p < 0.001) and distance (F(1,8) = 29.6, p = 0.001) but no interaction (F < 1). Therefore, 
even when overall accuracy in controls was reduced by presenting very long lists the distance 
manipulation had a relatively small effect.  
Individual patients: All patients were largely accurate at rejecting trials in which the 
probe did not match any of the list items. They were also proficient at detecting a match 
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between a probe and list item when they shared a close semantic relationship but performance 
declined considerably when the relationship was more distant. McNemar tests indicated that 
all patients were more likely to detect close semantic matches than distant ones (McNemar 
one-tailed p < 0.01). Modified t-tests indicated that all three patients were impaired in their 
ability to detect matching items (t(8) > 3.4, p < 0.005). In addition, JB and ABU showed a 
larger effect of the distance manipulation than did controls when assessed individually (t(8) > 
3.0, p < 0.02). The effect was not larger in JHU. Finally, only one patient (JHU) showed an 
effect of list length, performing more poorly on longer lists (χ2 = 4.88, p < 0.05). 
-Table 3 around here- 
Discussion 
 Here, we found evidence for impaired semantic control in a standard probe 
verification task that is commonly used to identify semantic STM impairment. As expected, 
patients were impaired on this task as a whole. However, this impairment was largely due to 
an impaired ability to detect weak or distant semantic relationships: patients performed much 
better when the probe and target was very similar or when there was no relationship present. 
This indicates that the critical factor influencing the patients’ semantic STM deficits was not 
the amount of semantic information they had to retain but rather the cognitive control 
demands of performing the necessary semantic judgement.  
We have assumed in this explanation that subjects completed this task on the basis of 
similarity – that they compared the probe to each list item and decided whether any of them 
were sufficiently similar to warrant a “yes” response. It is worth considering briefly whether 
an alternative strategy might have been used. Since subjects were told to match items from 
the same category, it is possible that they might have generated the category label for each 
item as it was presented and then compared their memory for the categories (rather than the 
items themselves) to the category label for the probe. However, this possibility provides no 
explanation for the observed semantic distance effects. The categories were the same in both 
conditions and the items were matched for typicality, so accessing the category information 
was equally easy on close and distant conditions. Since patients showed robust effects of 
semantic distance and controls showed much smaller but similar effects, we can conclude that 
the similarity of target and probe was an important factor in performing the task and that 
patients were impaired in dealing with weakly related targets and probes. 
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General Discussion 
 This study investigated semantic control in three patients who showed specific 
difficulty in maintaining semantic (but not phonological) information in STM. Rather than 
damage to a dedicated STM buffer for lexical-semantic information, we hypothesised that the 
root cause of these patients’ deficits was a more general impairment in executive control 
processes that regulate activation in the semantic system (i.e., semantic control). Three key 
findings emerged across experiments that probed different aspects of semantic control. First, 
all three patients showed signs of impairment on semantic tasks with minimal STM 
requirements. Second, the patients were more impaired in conditions that placed greater 
demands on semantic control. Third, these control effects were present for both STM tasks 
and visual tasks. These findings are consistent with the view that STM deficits for semantic 
information arise as a consequence of poor cognitive control over semantic activation. This 
problem is not specific to STM tasks. However, STM tasks are disproportionately affected as 
they have high control demands: they require activation of a number of semantic 
representations to be maintained simultaneously in the absence of the original stimulus. 
 According to this view, rather than a distinct disorder, semantic STM deficits are seen 
as occupying the least impaired end of a continuum of semantic control disorders. Other 
patients who have more pronounced semantic control impairments (referred to here as 
“semantic aphasics”) have the same underlying disorder but appear towards the more severe 
end of the spectrum. In line with this conclusion, Noonan et al. (2010) showed that SA 
patients were also sensitive to each of the control manipulations employed in the present 
study, though their overall levels of performance were lower than those of semantic STM 
cases. We also found small effects of control manipulations in healthy individuals. This is 
unsurprising and simply indicates that semantic control plays an important role in processing 
meaning in the unimpaired system in order to generate time- and task-appropriate behaviour 
(see Introduction and also Corbett et al., 2009; Noonan et al., 2010). It should be noted, 
however, that even on very demanding tasks (e.g., lists of six and seven words in Experiment 
4) the size of these effects were smaller than those seen in SA and in our semantic STM 
cases.  
Our findings are less consistent with the idea that semantic STM impairments reflect 
damage to a STM buffer specialised for the temporary retention of semantic information (R. 
C. Martin et al., 1994). The predictions of this theory depend to some extent on the assumed 
effects of damage to the buffer. If damage principally affected the capacity of the buffer (i.e., 
the number of semantic representations that can be maintained simultaneously) then no 
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control effects would be expected because this factor was held constant across conditions in 
all of our tasks. Damage to a buffer might also affect the duration over which semantic 
information can be held in an active state (i.e., rapid decay of information; see e.g., N. Martin 
& Saffran, 1997). The duration of presentation was the same across conditions, so this does 
not provide a parsimonious explanation of the observed control effects. However, there may 
have been some subtle differences in the time course of trials: it might take longer to arrive at 
a correct decision on the high control trials, with the result that patients had difficulty 
maintaining activation of the relevant semantic information for long enough to perform 
accurately. This possibility should be investigated in future studies. 
We should note that there was some variation in results across patients, with JHU 
failing to show better comprehension of dominant vs. less common meanings and failing to 
show a significantly larger semantic distance effect than controls in Experiment 4. We 
interpret this as reflecting individual differences in the susceptibility to particular control 
manipulations. Noonan et al. (2010) observed some inter-subject variability amongst SA 
patients in the size of effects on individual tasks, despite a clear pattern of impaired semantic 
control emerging in the study as a whole. One way to combat this individual variability is to 
compute group-level statistics as well as evaluating each subject individually. In each 
experiment, ANOVA revealed that, when considered as a group, the patients showed larger 
effects of semantic control than healthy individuals. Another approach is to search for a 
common pattern across multiple tasks that tap different aspects of the cognitive function in 
question. In this study, we probed four different aspects of semantic control and JHU did 
show the expected semantic control effects in cueing (Experiment 1), strength of distractors 
(Experiment 2) and semantic distance (Experiment 3).  
Our proposal that semantic STM deficits reflect impaired control of semantic 
activation is in line with recent investigations of another semantic STM patient (ML) by 
Hamilton and Martin (2005). Rather than rapid decay of semantic activation, they proposed 
that the STM deficit in this patient was the result of an underlying failure to inhibit verbal 
information. ML showed large interference effects in the Stroop task and also in a probe 
recognition task known as the recent negatives task. Here, ML had to decide whether a probe 
was contained in a list of items presented immediately before. On critical “recent negative” 
trials, the probe did not appear in the current list but had been presented on the previous trial. 
ML often incorrectly accepted these probes as being part of the current list, suggesting that 
activation from the previous trial interfered with memory for the current set. This behaviour 
is consistent with a cognitive control explanation of this patient’s deficit, as inhibition of 
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irrelevant information is a key requirement in regulating semantic knowledge. However, 
there are a number of reasons why a specific inhibition deficit is unlikely to be a complete 
explanation of our patients’ impairments. We manipulated semantic control demands in a 
variety of different ways across three experiments, yet the patients showed deficits on high 
control conditions on all tasks. While Experiments 1 and 2 clearly required inhibition of 
irrelevant semantic information, the role of inhibition was less clear in Experiments 3 and 4, 
as here the high control condition featured weak semantic associations but no distracting 
information. One way in which inhibition may have been important in the Experiment 4 is in 
ensuring words presented in previous trials did not interfere with the current trial. If the 
patients’ errors resulted from an inhibitory failure, we might expect persisting activation of 
items from previous trials to generate false positives when there was no matching item in the 
current list. In fact, the patients’ ability to correctly reject trials with no match was very good. 
One final piece of evidence against inhibition deficits was observed in Experiment 2, which 
required recall of one of three choice words. Here, our patients never recalled words from 
previous trials, as would be expected if activation was not inhibited properly (even though 
other patients with semantic STM deficits have shown this pattern in recall tasks (R. C. 
Martin & Lesch, 1996). On the basis of this evidence, it seems that our patients had a more 
general problem in regulating semantic information, rather than a specific inhibition deficit. 
These divergent findings may point to subtle underlying differences in the nature of 
the deficit in different semantic STM cases. In fact, while our patients all show the core 
features of a semantic STM deficit (i.e., poor STM for semantic information with intact 
phonological STM and no marked comprehension deficit) there are some differences between 
them and other cases in the literature, most notably with respect to lesion site. Previous 
semantic STM patients have had damage to the left inferior frontal gyrus (Hamilton & 
Martin, 2005; R. C. Martin et al., 1994), a region frequently associated with semantic 
selection and inhibition functions (Badre & Wagner, 2005; Nagel et al., 2008; Robinson, 
Blair, & Cipolotti, 1998; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1998). In contrast, scanning in our semantic STM cases JB and ABU 
points to damage centred on posterior temporal and inferior parietal cortex. Although these 
regions are often overlooked in discussions of semantic control, they are frequently also 
activated in neuroimaging studies that manipulate semantic control (Badre et al., 2005; 
Hirshorn & Thompson-Schill, 2006; Rodd et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Wagner 
et al., 2001). In addition, SA patients can present with damage to either inferior frontal or 
temporoparietal cortex yet show similar patterns of performance on semantic tasks (Berthier, 
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2001; Noonan et al., 2010). So both neuroimaging and neuropsychological data point to a 
network of brain regions involved in semantic control, including inferior prefrontal cortex as 
well as temporal and parietal regions. Our hypothesis, then, is that semantic control deficits 
can explain semantic STM deficits in patients with prefrontal as well as posterior lesions. 
However, the differences between our patients and patient ML may indicate a degree of 
specialisation within the control network, with prefrontal cortex particularly important for 
resolving interference between competing representations (explaining inhibition deficits in 
ML) while temporoparietal regions perform a more general control function (explaining 
control deficits without specific inhibitory problems in JB and ABU). A similar suggestion 
has been made by Badre et al. (2005) on the basis of neuroimaging data.  
Direct comparison of semantic STM patients with different lesions is needed to 
determine the extent to which all such patients can be said to share a common underlying 
control deficit. Another important target for future work is to investigate semantically 
impaired patients who do not show a disproportionate deficit on semantic STM tasks. We 
predict that semantic control would be relatively spared in such cases. The major contribution 
of this study is to demonstrate that semantic STM deficits can arise as a consequence of a 
more general cognitive control impairment for semantic information, of the kind seen in a 
variety of aphasic patients. The existence of semantic STM patients has previously motivated 
a highly specialised view of STM capacity with multiple dedicated stores (R. C. Martin et al., 
1994). By linking semantic STM deficits to more basic semantic control processes required 
across a broad range of tasks, we have shown that these patients are consistent with 
approaches in which STM capacity is dependent on the architecture of the language system 
(Acheson & MacDonald, 2009; N. Martin & Saffran, 1997).  
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Table 1: Background neuropsychological assessment 
 
 Max JB ABU JHU Healthy 
control 
mean 
Cut-off for 
normal 
performance 
Visuospatial skills       
VOSP       
   Incomplete letters 20 20 19 19 18.8 16 
   Number location 10 10 10 9 9.4 7 
   Cube analysis 10 10 9 10 9.2 6 
Rey figure copy 36 33 29 NT 34 30 
Executive function       
Ravens standard progressive 
matrices 
60 36 34 36 50 27 
Brixton test of spatial 
anticipation 
54 42 30 32 37 28 
Wisconsin card-sorting test 
(errors) 
128 15 50 57 27 < 64 
Note: JB’s executive function scores are from a more recent testing round than that reported 
in Hoffman et al. (2009) and suggest some recovery of executive function. NT = not tested. 
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Table 2: Semantic and short-term memory assessments 
 
 Max JB ABU JHU Controls  
     Mean Range 
Short-term memory       
Digit span       
   Forwards 8 7 5 7 6.8 5-8 
   Backwards 8 4 4 3 4.7 3-7 
Letter lists       
    Phonologically dissimilar % 98 74* 75* 88.3 80-97 
    Phonologically similar % 87 41* 49* 70.7 63-88 
Nonword lists % 57 32 29 28.9 18-46 
Word lists % 80 50* 40* 69.4 58-87 
Size of lexicality effect  % 23* 18* 11* 40.6 34-51 
Rhyme judgement span 9 8 6 9 6.98 4.7-9 
Category judgement span 7 2.7* 2.7* 2* 6.15 4.7-7 
       
Semantics       
Naming 64 58* 63 61 62.3 57-64 
Word-picture matching 64 64 61* 64 63.8 63-64 
Semantic association       
   Words 64 62 57 59 60.7 56-63 
   Pictures 64 59 57 49* 59.1 51-62 
Category fluency (8 categories)  62* 58* 56* 121.5 75-162 
* denotes abnormal scores. Digit, nonword, word and letter lists all involved immediate serial 
recall with auditory presentation. See Hoffman et al. (2009) for further details of these tests.
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Table 3: Semantic distance task in short-term memory (Experiment 4) 
 
List Length Trial Type Control mean (s.d.) JB ABU JHU 
1 and 2 No match  97 95 97 
 Close match  97 91 97 
 Distant match  59 25 75 
3 and 4 No match 95 (3.0) 100 84 100 
 Close match 94 (4.4) 91 81 72 
 Distant match 87 (9.0) 47 50 56 
6 and 7 No match 85 (7.2)    
 Close match 73 (13.4)    
 Distant match 63 (15.1)    
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Figure 1: Semantic Control Manipulations 
 
 
 Less Semantic Control More Semantic Control 
 
 
Resolving Ambiguity 
“I need some more ink for my 
pen” 
 
pen 
 
trumpet    pencil 
breeze    whale 
“They herded the sheep into 
the pen” 
 
pen 
 
trumpet    enclosure 
breeze    whale 
Effect of Cueing 
“She wore her new dress to 
the ball” 
 
ball 
 
phone    dance 
throat   seat 
“He tried hard to catch the 
ball” 
 
ball 
 
phone    dance 
throat   seat 
Ignoring  
Irrelevant 
Associations 
grease 
 
hair      oil      basis 
dragon 
 
fly      monster    melody 
 
 
Semantic Distance:  
visual presentation 
 
leopard 
 
lion       rose    coconut 
leopard 
 
octopus    rose    coconut 
 
 
Semantic Distance:  
STM task 
 
“train, shirt, leopard” 
 
Probe: lion? 
 
Correct response: Yes 
“train, shirt, octopus” 
 
Probe: lion? 
 
Correct response: Yes 
 
The correct response in each case is shown in bold.  A. More semantic control is needed 
when an infrequent interpretation of the target word must be accessed. This is particularly the 
case when the sentence cue primes the alternative word meaning. B. More semantic control is 
needed when a distractor word shares a strong association with the probe (e.g., dragon and 
fly).  C. More semantic control is needed when the target is only weakly related to the probe. 
D. Verifying that the list contains a match for lion (i.e., another animal) requires more control 
when the target and probe are weakly related. 
  
A 
B 
C 
D 
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Figure 2: Semantic Ambiguity Task (Experiment 1) 
 
 
 
Bars indicate standard error of control mean. 
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Figure 3: Ignoring Irrelevant Associations Task (Experiment 2) 
 
 
Bars indicate standard error of control mean. 
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Figure 4: Semantic Distance Task with Visual Presentation (Experiment 3) 
 
 
Bars indicate standard error of control mean. 
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Appendix: Stimuli for Experiment 1 
 
Probe Target in dominant 
meaning condition 
Target in less 
common meaning 
condition 
Distractor 
1 
Distractor 
2 
Distractor 
3 
scoop spoon newspaper chicken sister navy 
ball goal dance phone throat seat 
sock stocking punch bark cliff stew 
game toy hunt ramp sponge isle 
arm leg gun glass train key 
film movie skin coal prince golf 
leaf tree page sleep hat dust 
prune plum shrub cube mug soot 
foot base measure jack produce style 
pile heap carpet assault nerve troop 
throw pass blanket weather village chair 
grade mark slope contact kill dream 
toll bridge bell snow stone milk 
pump petrol shoe band soil kid 
head skull boss fur boot tar 
lip kiss edge sheet joy bomb 
plant vegetable factory cellar penny cream 
deposit cash dirt seed yard brain 
ear sound wheat flock paste pork 
blue yellow sad blind curve shear 
bank money river morning heart child 
juice fruit fuel sheep aunt laugh 
fire hot rifle dinner weight poet 
spray liquid flowers slave snake palace 
scrub wash bush chart coach gin 
pen pencil pig star meadow lemon 
yarn wool fable axle junction ulcer 
beam ray wood pope male lunch 
bar wine block song birth dress 
boil pan sore fleet ranch graph 
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Stimuli for Experiments 3 and 4 
Probe Close target Distant target Distractor 1 
(Expt 3) 
Distractor 2 
(Expt 3) 
Category 
(Expt 4) 
leopard lion octopus rose coconut animals 
whale seal mouse mushroom apple animals 
wasp bee lion daffodil bean animals 
shrimp lobster squirrel oak lemon animals 
mole mouse seal ivy potato animals 
donkey horse lobster fern cauliflower animals 
chipmunk squirrel bee wheat cherry animals 
squid octopus horse pine beetroot animals 
finch sparrow ostrich pine coconut birds 
magpie crow eagle mushroom cherry birds 
cockatoo parrot swan wheat cauliflower birds 
buzzard eagle gull ivy bean birds 
emu ostrich crow daffodil lemon birds 
cormorant gull chicken rose beetroot birds 
goose chicken parrot oak potato birds 
duck swan sparrow fern apple birds 
elm oak wheat lion swan plants 
toadstool mushroom fern horse ostrich plants 
holly ivy daffodil mouse crow plants 
daisy rose oak seal gull plants 
bracken fern rose octopus parrot plants 
fir pine ivy lobster chicken plants 
barley wheat pine squirrel sparrow plants 
bluebell daffodil mushroom bee eagle plants 
broccoli cauliflower apple lobster ostrich fruit+veg 
pear apple potato bee sparrow fruit+veg 
turnip beetroot cherry seal parrot fruit+veg 
pea bean lemon octopus chicken fruit+veg 
carrot potato coconut mouse eagle fruit+veg 
orange lemon beetroot horse gull fruit+veg 
pineapple coconut bean lion crow fruit+veg 
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grape cherry cauliflower squirrel swan fruit+veg 
bed futon table sledge stocking household 
freezer fridge radio aeroplane shirt household 
shower bath oven canoe shoe household 
stereo radio fridge pram jumper household 
chair sofa rug coach knickers household 
carpet rug sofa motorbike cap household 
cooker oven futon van belt household 
desk table bath yacht mitten household 
mallet hammer strimmer coach stocking tools 
watering can hosepipe spanner yacht belt tools 
paintbrush sandpaper rake motorbike mitten tools 
drill screwdriver spade van cap tools 
wrench spanner hosepipe pram jumper tools 
lawnmower strimmer sandpaper sledge shirt tools 
shovel spade screwdriver aeroplane shoe tools 
hoe rake hammer canoe knickers tools 
hat cap stocking futon spade clothes 
pants knickers jumper bath screwdriver clothes 
glove mitten shirt rug strimmer clothes 
blouse shirt cap oven hammer clothes 
cardigan jumper belt radio spanner clothes 
braces belt shoe sofa rake clothes 
boot shoe knickers table hosepipe clothes 
tights stocking mitten fridge sandpaper clothes 
ship yacht van radio hammer vehicles 
bus coach sledge table sandpaper vehicles 
pushchair pram coach sofa screwdriver vehicles 
helicopter aeroplane pram futon spanner vehicles 
scooter motorbike yacht rug spade vehicles 
lorry van canoe oven rake vehicles 
dingy canoe motorbike bath strimmer vehicles 
ski sledge aeroplane fridge hosepipe vehicles 
 
